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Article
Attempts to Measure Globalization
The first decade of the 21st century saw the development of 
numerous instruments with which to measure globalization 
processes.1 These are instruments that differ from each other 
in many respects, not infrequently because of different inter-
pretations of the concept of globalization on which they are 
based. In this regard, a first distinction can be drawn between, 
on the one hand, indexes that attempt to capture the multidi-
mensional nature of globalization and, on the other, those that 
focus exclusively on one dimension of the process, which is 
very often—but not always—the economic one. Considering 
that multidimensionality is one of the most characteristic fea-
tures of globalization, this article will consider only instru-
ments that adopt a multidimensional approach.
But besides differing because they take or do not take a 
multidimensional approach to measuring the phenomenon, 
globalization indexes are also distinguished by the choice of 
dimensions to be considered, the indicators used in con-
structing the index, the weights assigned to the indicators 
themselves, as well as the techniques by which the latter are 
aggregated. A further feature that differentiates among 
attempts made to date to measure globalization is whether 
they are essentially sporadic or, conversely, whether the 
instruments used are able to consolidate over time.
In this regard, four main instruments have received pro-
gressive development and at least some updating of the data 
on which they are constructed. First, there is the A. T. 
Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index (The Global 
Top 20, 2007): This has been the first globalization index to 
gain some visibility in the scientific debate, given that all the 
authors who have subsequently attempted to develop global-
ization indexes have made reference to it, although not infre-
quently doing so in critical terms. Then there are the CSGR 
Globalisation Index (Lockwood & Redoano, 2005), the 
Maastricht Globalisation Index (Martens & Raza, 2010), and 
finally the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, Gaston, & 
Martens, 2008), which, among the instruments mentioned, is 
perhaps the most interesting as it is the one for which the data 
have been most frequently updated, the last occasion being 
in 2013.2
Referring to Caselli (2012) for detailed analysis of the 
ways in which these instruments are constructed and the 
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Abstract
In the first decade of the 21st century, attempts to measure globalization have multiplied, and they have led to the devising 
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the dimensions considered, and the indicators used, the main feature shared by these instruments is the fact that they all 
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this premise, the aim of the article is, on the one hand, to justify in any case the use of instruments that seek to measure 
globalization on the basis of states, and, on the other, to propose alternative approaches to such measurement. The article’s 
underlying assumption is that different approaches to the measurement of globalization are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
such a plurality of perspectives is opportune and desirable given the complexity and multidimensionality of the concept of 
globalization.
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results that they have yielded, to be emphasized here is the 
remarkable similarity in the underlying structure of the four 
indexes mentioned, as evidenced in Table 1.
All four indexes, in fact, consider the economic and political 
dimensions of globalization. Likewise, all four of them consider 
both the social dimension—though the A. T. Kearney/Foreign 
Policy Globalization Index gives it a different name—and the 
technological dimension of the phenomenon, although the 
CSGR Globalisation Index and the KOF Index of Globalization 
consider these two dimensions jointly. The only exception is the 
Maastricht Globalisation Index, which, unlike the other three 
instruments, also includes an ecological dimension.
Because the cultural dimension of globalization is partic-
ularly difficult to measure,3 none of the above four indices 
includes it among its fundamental dimensions. Nevertheless, 
all the instruments comprise indicators and variables that can 
be entirely or partly related to the cultural aspects of global-
ization, and which are included in either the social or the 
technological dimension.
Comparison of the results of the four indices is compli-
cated by the fact that they refer to different years and are 
calculated for a more or less extensive range of countries.4 
However, Table 2 is an attempt to make such a comparison 
based on the relative positions of each country according to 
each index and limiting the analysis to the 55 countries for 
which all four indices have been calculated.
A first finding that emerges from the table is that the highest 
places in the rankings of all four indexes are mainly occupied by 
member-countries of the European Union, and particularly ones 
of small size.5 This finding prompts the question of the extent to 
which the instruments effectively measure the degree of global-
ization of countries and the extent to which, instead, they mea-
sure regionalization dynamics. Accordingly, it would be 
advisable for globalization indexes to consider not only flows 
and relations between a particular country and other countries, 
but also the number6 and the geographical position of those 
same countries (De Lombaerde & Iapadre, 2007). However, 
this undertaking would encounter the difficulty of collecting 
similar information, and the only (moreover partial) attempt in 
this direction has been made by Vujakovic (2010).
Inspection of Table 2 also shows that, while some coun-
tries are ranked by the various indices in substantially similar 
manner—this is the case, for example, of Switzerland, 
Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, Romania, Thailand, and 
Venezuela—there are others which the various instruments 
considered allocate to very different positions. This is the 
(striking) case of the United States, a country considered 
highly globalized by the A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy 
Globalization Index and by the CSGR Globalisation Index 
(5th and 4th position respectively) but which occupies decid-
edly lower positions in the classifications drawn up on the 
bases of the KOF Index of Globalization and the Maastricht 
Globalisation Index (22nd and 36th position respectively). 
Other countries whose positions are not determined unequiv-
ocally are, for example, Canada, China, Russia, and Panama.
These considerations show that estimates of the global-
ization levels of individual countries may vary even mark-
edly according to the measurement instrument used. This 
means that the choices made when constructing the instru-
ments—especially selection of the indicators, as well as 
deciding the aggregation procedure and the weights—have 
important repercussions on the results obtained.
Now that the results of four globalization indexes have 
been presented, albeit partially, some brief considerations 
can be made concerning the use of these results. First, as sug-
gested in Table 2, the results can be used synchronically to 
compare the levels of globalization of different countries. 
But they can also be used diachronically to consider the tem-
poral dimension to analyze the different speeds and trajecto-
ries with which countries are globalizing (or, conversely, 
de-globalizing): a temporal dimension of especial signifi-
cance because globalization is a process. For this purpose, 
however, the data necessary to calculate globalization 
indexes should be collected systematically and continuously 
in time, but this systematicity and continuity today seem 
guaranteed only, as said, by the KOF Index of Globalization.
The Nation-State as the Unit of 
Analysis for Globalization Indices: Pros 
and Cons
The indices presented in the previous section, as well as 
many others, are rather heterogeneous, but they are united by 
the fact that they all use the same unit of analysis: namely the 
nation-state. This choice is made “for convenience” because 
most of the statistical data, and therefore indicators, 
Table 1. Dimensions of the Main Globalization Indices: A Comparison.
ATK CSGR KOF MGI
Economic dimension Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political dimension Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social dimension Yes (called “personal contact”) Yes Yes Yes
Technological dimension Yes Included in the social dimension Included in the social dimension Yes
Ecological dimension No No No Yes
Note. ATK = A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index; CSGR = CSGR Globalisation Index; KOF = KOF Index of Globalization; MGI = Maastricht 
Globalisation Index.
Source. Caselli (2012, p. 98)
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Table 2. Classification of Countries Based on the Degree of Globalization Estimated by the Main Indices.
Rank ATK CSGR KOF MGI
 1 Netherlands Belgium Belgium Ireland
 2 Switzerland Canada Austria Belgium
 3 Ireland United Kingdom Netherlands Switzerland
 4 Denmark United States Switzerland Netherlands
 5 United States Austria Sweden France
 6 Canada Sweden Denmark Austria
 7 Jordan Switzerland Canada United Kingdom
 8 Estonia France Portugal Germany
 9 Sweden Denmark Finland Denmark
10 United Kingdom Ireland Hungary Spain
11 Australia Germany Ireland Israel
12 Austria Italy France Italy
13 Belgium Malaysia Spain Sweden
14 New Zealand Finland Germany Estonia
15 Norway Australia Australia Jordan
16 Finland Netherlands Norway South Korea
17 Israel New Zealand Italy Norway
18 Germany Russia Poland Greece
19 Malaysia South Korea United Kingdom Portugal
20 Hungary Japan New Zealand Japan
21 France Spain Estonia Malaysia
22 Bulgaria China United States New Zealand
23 Japan Jordan Greece Bulgaria
24 Spain Norway Bulgaria Poland
25 Panama Poland Chile Finland
26 Portugal Egypt Malaysia Australia
27 Italy Israel Jordan Romania
28 South Korea Portugal Belgium Russia
29 Romania Hungary Israel Egypt
30 Philippines Romania Romania Hungary
31 Costa Rica India Russia Tunisia
32 Morocco Estonia Japan Morocco
33 Poland Argentina Panama China
34 Chile Chile Costa Rica Canada
35 Greece Pakistan South Africa Thailand
36 Tunisia Greece South Korea United States
37 Mexico Kenya Thailand South Africa
38 Colombia Bulgaria Peru Costa Rica
39 Senegal Nigeria China Mexico
40 Thailand Brazil Tunisia Chile
41 Argentina South Africa Egypt Panama
42 Egypt Thailand Argentina Nigeria
43 Sri Lanka Indonesia Mexico India
44 Nigeria Morocco Morocco Pakistan
45 Peru Bangladesh Brazil Venezuela
46 South Africa Philippines Colombia Philippines
47 Kenya Tunisia Philippines Sri Lanka
48 Russia Senegal Indonesia Senegal
49 Pakistan Peru Nigeria Brazil
50 Bangladesh Mexico Venezuela Indonesia
51 China Costa Rica Pakistan Kenya
52 Brazil Venezuela Sri Lanka Colombia
53 Venezuela Sri Lanka India Argentina
54 Indonesia Panama Senegal Bangladesh
55 India Colombia Kenya Peru
Note. Only considered are the 55 countries for which all four indices have been calculated. Year of reference: ATK 2005, CSGR, 2004, KOF 2007, MGI 2008.
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available in regard to globalization have the state as the unit 
of analysis (Scholte, 2005, pp. 86-87). But this is not surpris-
ing if we consider that statistics and the use of indicators 
originally arose in regard to the state (Parra Saiani, 2009, pp. 
9-10)—as demonstrated by the etymology itself of the word 
“statistics.”
Yet the somewhat obligatory choice of this unit of analy-
sis raises some particularly problematic issues. One suspects, 
in fact, that measuring globalization by referring to the 
nation-state is to distort the very essence of the concept stud-
ied. As already pointed out by the scientific debate, it is of 
crucial importance to distinguish between globalization and 
internationalization: While the latter refers to processes and 
dynamics occurring within and in relation to the system of 
nation-states, the concept of globalization refers (also) to 
processes that unfold heedless of that system (Sklair, 1999, 
pp. 144-145). In this regard, various authors have stressed 
that the distinctive feature of globalization is deterritorializa-
tion (Giaccardi & Magatti, 2003; Sassen, 2000; Scholte, 
2000, pp. 48-9), or the emergence of processes entirely free 
of territorial constraints—processes, that is, which may be 
situated anywhere or, conversely, nowhere (in virtual space 
for example).
In light of these considerations, reflection on the theme of 
globalization has induced several authors to dispute what has 
been variously labeled “methodological nationalism” (Beck, 
2004), “embedded statism” (Sassen, 2000), or “methodolog-
ical territorialism” (Scholte, 2000): that is, the perspective 
largely dominant since the origins of the social sciences and 
which envisages a substantial overlap between the concept of 
society and that of the nation-state, which is therefore con-
sidered the natural container of economic, cultural, and polit-
ical processes.
That of the nation-state, therefore, cannot be the only per-
spective, the only lens through which one studies and analy-
ses a multidimensional and above all multiscalar process like 
globalization (Sassen, 2007). However, this does not mean 
that it is illegitimate to use the nation-state as the unit of anal-
ysis for construction of a globalization measure. Affirming 
the existence of deterritorialized dynamics and processes is 
not to deny the persisting and in many respects renewed 
importance of the spatial dimension of globalization. 
Globalization, in fact, is an extremely complex phenomenon, 
and part of its complexity resides in the fact that it can be 
interpreted from different points of view: The deterritorial-
ized dimension of globalization does not exclude the local-
ized one, and the global dimension does not exclude the local 
one. The national point of view is therefore one of the many 
legitimate points of view from which globalization can be 
read (Beck, 2004). This is of particular importance if one 
considers that the state contributes substantially to shaping 
globalization processes: For example, it is the state that fur-
nishes the infrastructures—particularly for transport and 
communications—that make possible the transnational flows 
that constitute the essence itself of globalization (Axford, 
2007, pp. 322-323). Added to this is the fact that 
nation-states continue to be key actors in the economic and 
social spheres (Ray, 2007, p. 75) as well as essential referents 
in the everyday lives of all the planet’s inhabitants.
Apart from practical convenience, therefore, using the 
nation-state as the unit of analysis in the study and measure-
ment of globalization processes is in many respects an 
acceptable procedure. However, this should not obscure the 
fact that this procedure, however legitimate, allows the ana-
lyst to grasp only some aspects of globalization and not oth-
ers, even though they are extremely significant. It has been 
pointed out, for example, that it is almost impossible to mea-
sure the ecological aspects of globalization by working on 
national bases (Dreher et al., 2008, p. 38). More generally, 
there is the problem of grasping more genuinely global 
aspects of the process on the basis of international data 
(Scholte, 2005, pp. 86-87). Nevertheless, if globalization 
processes are distinguished by their multiscalar nature, the 
problem is not so much finding and using units of analysis 
alternative to the nation-state as combining several units of 
analysis and, therefore, different perspectives of inquiry. 
This is said in the awareness that no perspective and no unit 
of analysis, on its own, can enable an exhaustive account to 
be made of the complexity of globalization processes.
Different Approaches
Although, for the reasons given above, it appears anyway 
acceptable to measure globalization on the basis of states—the 
paradox remains that studied at this level is a phenomenon 
among whose essential features is that, in certain significant 
domains, it annuls states, their role, and their boundaries. This 
latter consideration prompts the question as to whether instru-
ments can be devised that measure globalization using other 
units of analysis. It should nevertheless be immediately 
pointed out that attempts in this direction should not be 
regarded as antithetical to, or in conflict with, the most com-
mon approach based on the state. In fact, as repeatedly empha-
sized, globalization is an extraordinarily complex process that 
can be analyzed and interpreted from numerous standpoints 
that are not alternative to each other but, on the contrary, com-
plementary. As Beck (2004) puts it, the logic that guides us 
when analyzing globalization should not be that of “either . . . 
or . . . ” but rather “both . . . and . . . ”
In the same vein, Sassen (2007) explains—as already 
recalled in the previous section—that a distinctive feature of 
globalization is its multiscalar nature. That is to say, global-
ization exerts its effects differently according to the territo-
rial level considered—from the neighborhood to the planet 
as a whole. But there is something more. The effects of glo-
balization differ not only according to territorial level but 
also according to social level. For example, by virtue of the 
so-called “mobiletic revolution” (Gross, 1966; Russett, 
1967; Scidà, 1996, 2007), globalization transforms distances 
and therefore the configuration of physical space. Some dis-
tances shorten until they almost disappear and are no longer 
obstacles against human action, while others diminish much 
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less markedly. The extent of this contraction of distance 
depends primarily on the characteristics of the places 
involved, and especially on the infrastructures with which 
they are endowed: Ease of transport connections makes the 
main cities of Europe or North America much closer to each 
other than are villages in many African countries. But it also 
depends on the characteristics of the people involved: For 
example, the distance between the European Union and 
Kenya is much shorter for the average citizen of the former 
than it is for the average citizen of the latter.
Given these premises, a first unit of analysis—different 
from but, as said, not alternative to the state—which can be 
used to construct an index of globalization is the city. This 
unit of analysis has already been used by the instruments 
proposed by Taylor (2004), in particular the one designed to 
measure Global Network Connectivity, and by the A. T. 
Kearney/Foreign Policy Global Cities Index (The 2008 
Global Cities Index, 2008). These are instruments very dif-
ferent from each other in the number of cities taken into 
account and the way in which they are constructed,7 although 
they yield largely similar results: As shown in Table 3, in 
fact, fully 9 cities appear in the top 10 positions in the Global 
Network Connectivity and the Global Cities Index.
Here, however, my intention is to focus in particular on 
another possible unit of analysis for the construction of 
instruments with which to measure globalization: the person. 
Given that it has not yet been systematically applied, in the 
next section suggestions will be made in regard to its possi-
ble definition and implementation.
The Person-Based Approach
There are authors who point out that, with some exceptions, 
the human person is largely neglected by theories of global-
ization (Ley, 2004; Ray, 2007, p. 39). If this is so, it is not 
surprising that the instruments devised to measure the phe-
nomenon have to date used units of analysis different from 
the person. Nevertheless, I argue that an approach to the 
measurement of globalization that focuses on the single 
individual is broadly justifiable and, indeed, potentially very 
fertile for understanding the complex and multiform dynam-
ics with which globalization manifests itself. This contention 
is borne out by the fact that, within a particular state, but also 
in a particular city, globalization can and has very different 
effects and meanings for different people. Added to this is 
the fact that the world is not just a set of states, it is also a set 
of people, whose relationships are not always mediated by 
their membership of a state or nation (Sen, 2002, p. 66).
Yet the aim of this section is not to devise an instrument 
for the measurement of globalization whose unit of analysis 
is the persons. Instead, its more modest intention is to put 
forward suggestions on how such an instrument could be 
constructed.8
Broadly speaking, I believe that a Person-Based 
Globalization Index (PBGI) should consider the following 
six main dimensions: (a) possession of the resources and the 
abilities necessary to move and act in the global scenario; (b) 
effective mobility and activity in supranational and tenden-
cially global domains; (c) belonging and a sense of belong-
ing to global, or at any rate nonterritorial, entities; (d) 
exposure to global flows of mass communication; (e) partici-
pation in global, or at any rate supranational, communication 
flows; and (f) degree of global consciousness.
Possession of the Resources and the Abilities 
Necessary to Move and Act in the Global 
Scenario
The ability to act in a context more extensive than the local 
and national one, and the ability to live, so to speak, global-
ization and not just undergo its consequences derives from 
possession of certain specific capacities and material 
resources. Indicators of this dimension could be, for instance, 
knowledge of an international lingua franca (primarily 
English), possession of a passport, possession of a credit 
card, access to the Internet and the ability to use it, and the 
amount of personal income. In regard to the first of these 
indicators—relative to language—it might be objected that 
this would benefit a priori the citizens of English-speaking 
countries. I would respond to this objection by pointing out 
that knowledge of English (but also other languages, perhaps 
with the attribution of diversified weights) is anyway an 
objective and important factor in the ability to move in the 
global scenario. It should therefore be considered.
Effective Mobility and Activity in Supranational 
and Tendencially Global Domains
Endowment with the above-mentioned resources and capacities 
may give rise to different forms—and especially intensities—of 
action in the global sphere. An element certainly to be consid-
ered is the international physical mobility of the subjects stud-
ied. In particular, one indicator could be the number of times in 
which, in a given period of time, a national border has been 
Table 3. Comparison Among the Top 10 Cities in Relation to 
the Global Network Connectivity Index (Reference Year: 2000) and 
the Global Cities Index (Year of Publication: 2008).
Rank Global network connectivity Global Cities Index
 1 London New York
 2 New York London
 3 Hong Kong Paris
 4 Paris Tokyo
 5 Tokyo Hong Kong
 6 Singapore Los Angeles
 7 Chicago Singapore
 8 Milan Chicago
 9 Los Angeles Seoul
10 Toronto Toronto
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crossed. However, this indicator should be combined with infor-
mation relative to the number of borders crossed, as well as to 
the locations of the countries visited, the purpose being to distin-
guish (or at any rate evaluate differently) globalization from 
regionalization—or from commuting dynamics, as in the case 
of transfrontier workers: This problem has already been men-
tioned when examining the results of the tools that measure glo-
balization on the basis of the nation-state.
Consideration could also be made of information con-
cerning the range of action of people’s jobs and investments. 
Further indicators could be the frequency with which sub-
jects find themselves in what Marc Augé (1992) calls “non-
places”: That is, spaces devoid of local features and therefore 
able to minimize the cultural attrition due to travel and action 
in foreign countries, such as airports or hotels belonging to 
the great international chains. Again, this dimension could 
comprise the deliberate use and consumption of foreign 
products.9
Belonging and a Sense of Belonging to Global, or 
at Any Rate Nonterritorial, Entities
As rightly emphasized by Sen (2002, p. 63), people increas-
ingly identify with groups, or they have a sense of belonging, 
which are genuinely global in that they exist not through but 
despite national boundaries. This is a dimension that cannot 
be immediately translated into empirical terms, and whose 
detailed definition would be beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. However, I suggest that its principal indicator 
might be membership of, and activity in, groups of suprana-
tional extension. Tied to the sense of global belonging is also 
the spread of cosmopolitan lifestyles, attitudes, and relations 
(Hannerz, 1990). However, this is a key dimension of that 
cultural globalization that is very hard to grasp by using ter-
ritorial indicators. A PBGI instead appears decidedly more 
promising, although identification of the specific indicators 
to use would require reflection falling outside the scope of 
this contribution. A proposal might be to use statements 
reflecting a more or less cosmopolitan vision of the world, 
and with which the subjects studied would express their 
degree of agreement or disagreement. The dimension of the 
sense of global belonging would thus also include, ulti-
mately, the sharing of planetary-level values and principles, 
such as those expressed by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. However, the inclusion of references to val-
ues in an instrument intended to be applicable to a global 
scale appears problematic. In fact, the risk of ethnocentrism 
is very high—and consequently so too is the risk that the 
instrument will not gain wide recognition.
Exposure to Global Flows of Mass 
Communication
A particularly important aspect of globalization is the exis-
tence of communication flows that traverse the planet in 
asymmetric and fundamentally unidirectional manner. There 
are consequently news stories—but also images, values, and 
patterns of consumption—which may be known to all or 
almost all of the planet’s inhabitants, and which all or almost 
all of the planet’s inhabitants can form an opinion about or 
discuss. An indicator of this dimension could be, for instance, 
the frequency with which people watch or listen to interna-
tional television or radio news broadcasts, the frequency 
with which they visit international information websites, or 
their knowledge about certain global events (for example, 
the venue of the last Olympic Games or the last World 
Football Championships).
Participation in Global, or at Any Rate 
Supranational, Communication Flows
The inhabitants of the Earth are not just passive recipients of 
the information and communication flows that traverse the 
planet. Very often, they themselves generate such flows, 
especially in the form of interpersonal communications at a 
distance. Indeed, thanks to the development of communica-
tion media and abatement of their costs, our planet is swathed 
by an extremely dense network of communications; a net-
work whose existence is a further distinctive feature of glo-
balization, and whose nodes are single individuals (or small 
groups). Indicators of this dimension could be the interna-
tional contacts—telephone calls, SMS, email exchanges, and 
other contacts via the Web, as well as those through social 
networks like Facebook—made in a particular interval of 
time. In this case, too, as suggested above in regard to physi-
cal mobility, consideration should be made of the number 
and the locations of the countries involved in such exchanges, 
so that it is possible to distinguish genuinely global factors 
and situations from others that also come about on a suprana-
tional scale.
Degree of Global Consciousness
“Global consciousness” is probably the aspect of globaliza-
tion that is most difficult to study, and which, therefore, is 
least studied (Holton, 2005, p. 39). This is so despite the fact 
that—as emphasized since the first studies on the phenome-
non (Giddens, 1991; Robertson, 1992)—it is one of the con-
stitutive dimensions of globalization itself. And also despite 
the fact that the manner in which people interpret globaliza-
tion processes, as well as their emotional reactions to them, 
play a crucial role in determining the strategies and the 
courses of action enacted individually and collectively in 
response to globalization. For example, the difficulty of 
implementing joint supranational policies to address issues 
of global importance, such as protection of the natural envi-
ronment or the management of economic and financial cri-
ses, is probably due to the fact that, as some authors suspect, 
there is still insufficient awareness of the global reach of 
such issues (Kennedy, 2010, p. 5). Measurement of global 
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consciousness is precluded to instruments that use territorial 
units of analysis, but it becomes possible when the unit of 
analysis is the person—which further testifies to the poten-
tial of this approach. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that 
the concept of global consciousness is very difficult to opera-
tionalize: that is, convert into empirically measurable terms. 
In this case, too, I suggest as possible indicators various 
stimuli with which to record the degree of agreement or dis-
agreement of informants with statements concerning interde-
pendence relations among different parts of the planet.
Besides theoretical considerations that may modify, 
enrich, or even reverse my suggestions concerning the pos-
sible dimensions and indicators with which to construct a 
PBGI, when creating such an instrument, a practical problem 
of particular importance would arise. Unlike the indices 
based on states or cities, in fact, a PBGI cannot be calculated 
on the basis of secondary data—that is, data collected from 
already-existing statistical sources. Nor, as in the case of the 
instrument proposed by Taylor, can it be calculated on the 
basis of information obtainable with “desk work”—for 
example, the exploration and analysis of websites. It will be 
instead necessary to go into the field and directly question a 
sample of informants: An operation that obviously entails 
difficulties in terms of organization and costs. In this regard, 
while a survey conducted on a planetary scale is unthinkable, 
ones of lesser extent, but nevertheless multilocal in scale, are 
feasible. However, the degree of territorial coverage will be 
less than that obtained by using the other instruments men-
tioned in the previous sections.
Given this difficulty and this consequent limitation, the 
construction of a PBGI should move through a first experi-
mental phase, during which the largest possible number of 
indicators are tested for each of the above-suggested dimen-
sions, as well as possible others. Subsequently, the results of 
this first phase should serve to select the indicators, among 
all those tested, to be included in the definitive PBGI. These 
indicators should be as few in number as possible. A particu-
larly “slender” instrument, in fact, would not require the con-
duct of an ad hoc survey; on the contrary, it could be easily 
inserted into the numerous surveys periodically carried out 
in almost every part of the world, thus making the datum of 
the PBGI available on a potentially global scale.
Having stated the difficulties involved in the construction 
of a PBGI, also to be emphasized is what instead is one of its 
main strengths. This consists in the fact that, because the per-
son is an elementary unit, the data collected in this way can 
then be combined in multiple different forms. The person-
based approach, therefore, is not incompatible with those 
based on states or cities. For the information collected and 
organized by means of a PBGI would also be able, for exam-
ple, to show the percentage of globalized subjects resident in 
a state or a city, and also in a sub- or supranational region. 
But this same information could also be used to compare the 
different levels of globalization among the members of dif-
ferent professions, or among different scientific communi-
ties, where the last two categories cut across the nation-state 
dimension. Besides comparing the different levels of global-
ization, a PBGI could easily be used to identify and analyze 
the factors that most influence the degree of globalization of 
a person, community, or geographical area. The data of a 
PBGI would be characterized, that is to say, by high mallea-
bility, and they could therefore be adapted to different needs 
of research and analysis. Finally, as already emphasized in 
regard to the globalization indexes based on states, a PBGI 
could be used not only for synchronic comparisons but also 
for diachronic analysis. However, the latter would require 
further effort in data collection, with more surveys at regular 
intervals.
Conclusion
In conclusion, globalization is a multiscalar and multidimen-
sional process difficult to grasp in its many aspects with a 
single measurement instrument. The simultaneous use of 
tools based on different units of analysis could nevertheless 
furnish a sufficiently rich and comprehensive account of its 
main dimensions.
However, there are crucial elements of globalization that 
cannot be grasped with tools that use the state, the city, or the 
person as their unit of analysis. This concerns the systemic 
elements of globalization, which can only be captured if the 
entire planet is used as the unit of analysis. Some of these 
elements, particularly those of an economic kind like the vol-
ume of world trade in proportion to global GDP, can be eas-
ily measured and used, in particular to determine their 
evolution over time. Instead, other elements, consisting of 
“indivisible” factors that involve all the inhabitants of the 
Earth, regardless of their spatial locations and social circum-
stances (Caselli, 2004), appear more difficult if not impossi-
ble to measure. These factors are, for example, the 
sustainability and exploitation of natural resources, or the 
threat raised by the existence of nuclear weapons. To these 
should be added the existence of certain procedures, tech-
niques, and “expert systems” now used on a truly global 
scale. These are the procedures, techniques, and “expert sys-
tems which make possible the flows of money, products, 
ideas, and people that the current globalization indices seek 
to measure. While these elements may not be measurable, it 
should nevertheless be stressed that a PBGI—and this is a 
further advantage of it—could quantify the degree of aware-
ness of their existence among people; in other words, as 
emphasized in the previous section, it could measure that 
“global consciousness” which constitutes a key component 
of globalization itself.
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Notes
1. This contribution draws on and develops discussion in Caselli 
(2012).
2. See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch
3. To be mentioned in this regard is the Cultural Globalization 
Index proposed by Kluver and Fu (2008).
4. With reference to the most recent data offered by each instru-
ment, in fact, the A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization 
Index has been calculated for 72 countries, the CSGR 
Globalisation Index for 103, the Maastricht Globalisation 
Index for 117, and the KOF Index of Globalization for 187.
5. Small and/or less populated countries are, so to speak, forced 
to have relations with other countries. For this reason, the 
CSGR Globalisation Index has introduced a correction fac-
tor—in relation to economic indicators alone—which takes 
account of certain physical and demographic characteristics of 
the country considered. See Lockwood and Redoano (2005).
6. If, for instance, a country records high trade volumes, but these 
are primarily directed toward only one other country, this does not 
mean that it is strongly globalized; on the contrary, it means that it 
is strongly dependent (Kluver & Fu, 2008, p. 341).
7. For details once again see Caselli 2012.
8. For this reason, not discussed here are certain crucial technical 
aspects of construction of an index of this kind: for instance, 
the weighting of the indicators or the translation of the infor-
mation collected in the field into aggregable values (normal-
ization). For thorough examination of the options available to 
the researcher, see Caselli (2012, pp. 22-24).
9. I have emphasized “deliberate” because consumers very often 
do not know the real origins of the products that they use: In 
the absence of such awareness, it is difficult to collect informa-
tion useful for construction of the index.
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